Creating the Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity Effect Through Campbell's Indices of Entitativity by Rea, Andrew J.
CREATING THE INTERINDIVIDUAL-INTERGROUP DISCONTINUITY EFFECT
THROUGH CAMPBELL’S INDICES OF ENTITATIVITY
Andrew J. Rea
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of
Psychology.
Chapel Hill 2007
Approved by
Advisor: Chester Insko
Reader: Lawrence Sanna
Reader: B. Keith Payne
ii
ABSTRACT
ANDREW REA: Creating the Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity Effect Through
Campbell’s Indices of Entitativity
(Under the direction of Dr. Chester Insko)
This study seeks to apply indices of entitativity taken from Campbell’s ideas concerning the
status of social aggregates (1958) to the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect.
Common fate, similarity, and proximity were manipulated as participants play a prisoner’s
dilemma game. Entitativity was considered to be behaviorally evidenced when participants
made higher proportions of competitive choices. Increased competition was found for both
individuals interacting with groups and groups interacting with individuals in the presence of
common fate consistent with the body of literature. A two-way interaction for groups
interacting with individuals was found in which proximity accentuated the effect of common
fate. Perceived entitativity was not found to significantly mediate any of these effects.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A continuing area of interest in social psychology relates to the tendency of
interactions between groups to involve more conflict than interactions between individuals.
This tendency has been termed the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect and has
been demonstrated many times in laboratory settings (see Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, &
Schopler, 2003 for a meta-analysis of these studies). Although several studies in this area
have examined the conditions necessary for group entitativity or “groupness” (Insko,
Pinkley, Herring, Holton, Hong, Krams, Hoyle, & Thibaut, 1987; Insko, Pinkley, Hong,
Slim, Dalton, Lin, Ruffin, Dardis, Bernthal, & Schopler, 1988), no discontinuity study thus
far has addressed the combined effects of proximity, similarity, and common fate. These
factors, including an additional factor named “pregnance”, were put forth by Wertheimer
(1923) as the factors leading to the perception of discrete elements as a single figure.
Campbell (1958) applied these factors to the determination of the entitativity of social
aggregates (although he did not apply Wertheimer’s concept of pregnance). Campbell
(1958) indicated that common fate and similarity might be more important than proximity
when determining entitativity, and common fate may be more central to the diagnosis of
entitativity than similarity. The present research focuses on applying these principles to the
creation of discontinuity in a laboratory setting.
The first explicit test of the discontinuity effect was conducted by McCallum,
Harring, Gilmore, Drenan, Chase, Insko, and Thibaut (1985). However, the problem of
2group actions has been mentioned in the writings of numerous philosophers and social
scientists throughout history (Plato, 1997; Le Bon, 1895; McDougall, 1920; Brown, 1954;
Allport, 1962). Plato in The Republic is generally skeptical of democratic group rule.
Similarly, Le Bon (1895) writes of cultivated men becoming barbaric in crowds. This view
is echoed by both McDougall (1920) and Brown (1954) (from whom we get the term
“discontinuity.”)
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
The discontinuity effect has been actively studied ever since McCallum et al.’s (1985)
study. The majority of research centers on the use of the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG).
In a basic PDG game, two individuals or groups are each given a choice between two options
which will be referred to as “X” and “Y.” Outcomes for the different combinations of
choices for each of the sides are represented in Figure 1. If both entities playing choose “X,”
both will receive a moderately high outcome. If both choose “Y,” both will receive a
moderately low outcome. In cases where participants make different choices, the participant
choosing “Y” will achieve the highest possible outcome while the participant choosing “X”
will receive the lowest possible outcome. If one picks “Y” one can never “lose” the PDG.
However, if everyone picks “Y” no one can “win.” Such is the dilemma.
One goal the interaction partners might pursue is the maximization of joint outcomes.
This only works if one’s interaction partner is also willing to forego the allure of choosing
“Y” when one chooses “X.” These characteristics of the PDG produce a conflict of interest,
or noncorrespondence of outcomes, which is thought to be necessary for observing the
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Schopler & Insko,
1992; Schopler, Insko, Wieselquist, Pemberton, Witcher, Kozar, Roddenberry, & Wildschut,
32001). Discontinuity is observed in PDG setting when groups pick “Y” more often than
individuals. While it is possible to observe discontinuity in non-matrix contexts that have
conflicts of interest as shown by Insko, Schopler, Graetz, Drigotas, Currey, Smith, Brazil, &
Bornstein (1994), the PDG format is still eminently useful for this type of research.
Fear and Greed
Two major factors have been advanced as explanations for the greater
competitiveness shown by groups as compared to individuals. One of these is greed (Insko ,
Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990; Schopler & Insko, 1992; Schopler, Insko, Graetz,
Drigotas, Smith, & Dahl, 1993; Wildschut et al., 2003). It is not the case that individuals
cannot be greedy. The greed hypothesis states that there exists a “social support for shared
self-interest (Schopler & Insko, 1992).” Groups may assume that they will be able to exploit
their interaction partners who they assume will choose “X.” Groups provide a mutual
support for pursuing a selfish maximization of short-term outcomes. Individuals have no
support for pursuing a strategy of exploitation.
Discontinuity has also been explained in terms of increased fear (Insko et al., 1990,
Schopler & Insko, 1992; Schopler, et al., 1993; Wildschut et al., 2003). This fear is said to
be a result of a negative outgroup schema (Schopler & Insko, 1992). Before interaction
begins, participants will assume more competition from their interaction partners.
Communication between groups is then seen as less trustworthy and is less effective in
producing cooperation (Insko, Schopler, Drigotas, Graetz, Kennedy, Cox, & Bornstein,
1993).
4Communication
Most experiments in this area have involved unconstrained communication between
interaction partners whether groups or individuals. A setting such as this creates the largest
magnitude of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect (Insko et al., 1993;
Wildschut et al., 2003). For some experimental manipulations, it is not advantageous to have
unconstrained communication. Discontinuity studies have also been performed in the
absence of communication and have been found to yield a smaller magnitude of effect
(Wildschut et al., 2003). Intermediate effects are obtained when constrained cooperative
communication is used (Wildschut et al., 2003). Lodewijkx, Wildschut, Syroit, Visser, and
Rabbie (1999) had participants write notes to exchange with one another. Experimenters
substituted notes containing cooperative messages for the participants’ notes. Even though
this sort of procedure decreases the magnitude of the effect, it has the added benefit of
increasing the number of independent units of analysis in each session.
Procedural Interdependence
One factor that is particularly important for generating discontinuity is procedural
interdependence (Wildschut, Lodewijkx, & Insko, 2001). Generally, discontinuity
experiments create procedural interdependence by requiring groups to make a collective
decision and follow a consensus rule. Wildschut et al.’s (2003) discontinuity meta-analysis
finds that the discontinuity effect is larger in cases where procedural interdependence is
present. Directly related to this issue, Insko et al. (1988) find that consensus is necessary for
the creation of entitativity. In their study, Insko et al. (1988) had five different conditions. In
one condition, participants on one side possessed outcome interdependence. With outcome
interdependence participants shared their earnings. An individuals condition was not
5included because previous research had found it did not differ from the outcome
interdependence conditions (Insko, Pinkley, Hoyle, Dalton, Hong, Slim, Landry, Holton,
Ruffin, & Thibaut, 1987). The second condition (contact) placed participants in the same
room, but did not allow discussion within the room. The third condition required discussion.
The fourth required consensus. Finally, there was a condition where all the participants
interacted collectively as groups (group-all). Lower amounts of cooperativeness were found
for participants in the group-all and consensus conditions relative to the other conditions.
This was the most direct assessment of entitativity in a discontinuity context. If a case can be
made that procedural interdependence in the form of consensus is analogous to common fate,
we may be able to draw a parallel between Insko et al.’s (1988) findings for discontinuity and
Campbell’s reasoning regarding entitativity.
Entitativity
Entitativity research itself has not lain dormant even though it has gone by names
such as “groupness” and “perceived unity.” Hamilton and Sherman (1996) provide a good
review of research into differences in the outcomes of impressions formed of individuals and
group targets. Relatively recently, research has sought to bring together the areas of social
cognition and intergroup processes (Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Hamilton &
Sherman, 1996; Sedikides, Schopler, & Insko, 1998; Dasgupta, Banaji, & Abelson, 1999).
McConnell, Sherman and Hamilton (1994) found that social information is processed
differently for group and individual targets. These same authors, in a later study,
manipulated similarity to affect target entitativity in both groups and individuals (McConnell
et al., 1997). Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske (1998) in their study on social attribution
manipulated entitativity by providing information about which colleges participants attended.
6Most recently, Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, and Sherman (2007) found that entitativity
predicted stereotyping of social categories and making stereotype-like judgments about task
groups.
Nearly all of these recent studies in entitativity make mention of Campbell’s (1958)
paper on indices of entitativity. Common fate, proximity, and similarity are still variables
that are relevant to entitativity research. Some papers, such as Yzerbyt et al. (1998) have
used one of the variables alone (similarity) in their experiments. Abelson et al. (1998)
manipulated similarity and proximity in one of their experiments involving perceptions of
novel stimuli (humanoid creatures). Increased entitativity resulting from similarity and
proximity exacerbated participants’ beliefs of how threatening groups of humanoid creatures
were. Physical similarity can lead to a perception of psychological similarity which
Campbell (1958) originally conceptualized as being pertinent to determining entitativity in
social aggregates (Abelson et al., 1998; Dasgupta et al., 1999).
For the current experiment, we use common fate, proximity, and similarity in an
attempt to produce the discontinuity effect. Common fate was originally conceptualized as
relating to objects moving in the same direction, but is generalized by Campbell to relate to
any common change over time. According to Campbell: “The essence of the common fate
coefficient is co-variability in time, and other variable parameters such as activity level,
temperature, reflected light, morale, hedonic tone, nutritional status, etc. could be employed
(Campbell, 1958, p. 21)” Using a majority vote to ensure change from individual preference
to group decision thus can be seen as a manifestation of common fate.
Proximity has also been addressed in the “contact” condition of Insko et al.’s (1988)
study on the role of consensus rule. Although Insko et al. (1988) did not find discontinuity
7occurring in the contact condition, Campbell (1958) indicates that proximity can create
perceived similarity and that similarity is often linked to common fate. Proximity can thus be
diagnostic of common fate. Thus, the relationship between proximity and entitativity may be
complex.
Insko et al. (1987) found that mere categorization is not enough to create entitativity
sufficient for increased competition. Their study used a procedure similar to Tajfel’s (1969)
minimal groups paradigm with participants being categorized as either preferring the art of
Klee or Kandinsky. They find categorization will only produce increased competition in
cases where inter-category competition is conveyed as appropriate by an assumed social
consensus (i.e. when participants knew their fellow category members had been competitive
they were also competitive). We can look to this study as an example of similarity in a
discontinuity context because the categorization involved similar preferences in art. It is
apparent that Campbell (1958) thought of these indices as interconnected. Campbell (1958)
states:
While in general, common fate may be found to be more central to the diagnosis of
entities than similarity, there is often in practical diagnostic procedures an iteration
between similarity and common fate criteria in which an observed similarity
dimension may provide a hypothesized grouping which is then tested for intragroup
homogeneity on various dimensions of common fate. (p. 21)
Why is common fate more central to a diagnosis of entitativity? For objects, common fate
would be a more reliable predictor of whether particles make up a whole. Particles of a rock
could be similar and close together, but movement in different directions would preclude a
diagnosis of entitativity. In social interaction, common fate may be more important because
8it will often describe if people will act as a group. Of the three indices, it is the only one that
involves change over time. It would make sense for people to pay attention to such a
dynamic factor for self-defense reasons. Common fate may stimulate the fear that leads to
the discontinuity effect.
It is possible that both proximity and similarity may make common fate more salient
and lead to a greater degree of competition. While proximity and similarity themselves do
not seem to create the entitativity needed to produce the discontinuity effect, it is possible
they may interact to produce greater competition relative to individuals. In any case, it seems
that common fate is central to a diagnosis of entitativity. The other factors may increase
entitativity in the presence of common fate by acting as cues that increase the salience of
common fate.
In our study we manipulated the variables in a 2 Common fate X 2 Proximity X 2
Similarity design. Similarity was manipulated by using a modified Klee-Kandinsky task
similar to that used by Insko et al. (1987). Proximity was manipulated as it was in Insko et
al.’s (1988) experiment by having participants located in the same room. There was only one
trial. As stated before, the constrained communication tends to lead to a smaller
discontinuity effect (Wildschut et al., 2003). We attempted to maximize the discontinuity
effect by having participants expect only one trial (Insko, Schopler, Gaertner, Wildschut,
Kozar, Pinter, Finkel, Brazil, Cecil, & Montoya, 2001). With this approach we manipulated
the entitativity of only one side with the other side remaining individuals. For the rest of this
paper we will refer to the side of those whose entitativity we manipulated as the “observed
participants.” The other side will be known as the “observers” The artistic preferences
from the modified Klee-Kandinsky task of those on the observed side were manipulated to
9alter the perceived similarity of those on that side to each other. Those on the observed side
were either in individual rooms or a single room. Participants on the observed side were
either subject to majority vote or made individual decisions as did the observers. Each
observer “interacted” with one observed participant who either was or was not constrained by
a majority vote, was or was not in a common room, and did or did not share an artistic
preference.
This approach of individuals interacting with groups is not without precedent.
Winquist and Larson (2004) studied groups interacting with individuals in addition to the
standard group-group and individual-individual interaction in the discontinuity literature.
They found that individuals interacting with groups were more competitive than individuals
interacting with individuals. It was also found that groups were more competitive than
individuals. Wildschut, Insko and Pinter (in press) have also used this approach and likewise
found that groups interacting with individuals compete more than individuals interacting with
individuals.
Hypotheses
We hypothesized a main effect for level of common fate on both choice and
entitativity. The variables should also produce significant two-way interactions where each
variable will have a greater effect in the presence of one of the others. There are several
alternatives to our primary hypotheses. It is possible that any one factor is sufficient to
produce maximum levels of entitativity. It is also possible that they will interact, but
common fate will not be superior to the others. Any of these outcomes are possibilities.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
One hundred and seventy-four female undergraduates from an introductory
psychology course at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill participated in this
research. Participants earned between $0.55 and $2.05 during their participation.
Units of Analysis
The participants in the experiment did not actually interact with each other. Also, any
written communications exchanged or artistic preferences given were falsified. Therefore,
the six participants in each session were counted as separate units of analysis. The data from
the observers and the observed side were analyzed separately. Participants who reported
having experience with the PDG or similar social dilemmas were excluded from analysis.
This left one hundred and forty-four participants (seventy-two on each side).
Independent Variables
This study used a 2 Common Fate X 2 Proximity X 2 Similarity between-subjects
design. Common fate was manipulated by telling participants that one side would have their
responses determined by a majority vote. To avoid confounding, this vote was not discussed
among the participants. Participants simply gave their responses with the knowledge that the
majority choice would be taken as the response for all people on that side.
The layout of the experimental suite allowed for the manipulation of proximity. The
suite had a main area with seven rooms opening into it. There were two sets of three rooms
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on two opposite sides of the suite separated by the main area. A third side had only one room,
which the experimenter occupied. The fourth side was the door of the suite. The
experimenter gave instructions from the main area. Proximity was manipulated by placing
the observed participants in three separate rooms on a given side or in the same room on a
given side. The observers on the opposite side were always in three separate rooms. Thus,
half of the conditions had participants in six separate rooms while half had three in one room
and three in separate rooms. In all conditions each observer only “interacted” with the
person immediately across from him or her.
Similarity was manipulated by a modified version of the Klee-Kandinsky task used
by Insko et al. (1987) and adapted from Tajfel’s (1969) minimal groups paradigm. Instead of
using two artists, three were used. The third artist was Franz Marc. However, the only
paintings used were those of Klee and Kandinsky. Participants could also be told that they
had no strong preference for any of the three artists. In half of the conditions, participants on
the observed side were told that they had the same artistic preference, and in half were told
that they each preferred a different artist. The participants on the observers’ side were
always informed that they had “no strong preference.” Participants on the observed side
knew the preferences of everyone in the suite. Participants on the observers’ side knew only
their own preference and the preferences of those on the observed side. The instructions
were intended to avoid creating a sense of similarity between the “interacting” pairs of
participants. The participants on the observed side may have thought of those on the
observers’ side as possessing a degree of similarity because they all were represented as
having no strong preference. No participants were aware of the differential knowledge of the
two sides.
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Procedure
Participants entered the suite, were seated in the main area, and instructed to refrain
from speaking to one another. Instructions were read to the participants from a script. Care
was taken to avoid mentioning the word “group” overtly while instructing the participants.
Informed consent forms were given to the participants and they were asked to read and sign
them if they agreed to participate in the experiment. After signing the consent forms,
participants drew numbered cards. The numbers were used to keep materials together and to
assign rooms. After drawing the cards, the experimenter informed participants that they
would be tested for their artistic preferences.
The lights were dimmed and participants viewed five pairs of slides that were
paintings of two of the artists in question. They circled “left” or “right” on a sheet to indicate
their preferences. The experimenter collected these sheets and took them to the experimenter
room where he pretended to tally the preferences. After this, he re-entered the main area and
placed participants into rooms by telling them “please take your things and move to the room
I assign you.” The experimenter then used the numbers that participants had drawn to assign
them to rooms corresponding to those numbers. In proximity conditions, the three
participants on the observed side were put in the same room, and were instructed not to talk
to one another. They were given a simple PDG matrix (Figure 1.) and the outcomes on it
were explained to them. In half the conditions, participants were told that one side’s
responses would be determined by majority vote.
Next, as a rationale for indicating supposed artistic preferences, it was explained to
the participants that people were often more comfortable interacting when they knew
something about one another. Participants were then given a card displaying a rough
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blueprint of the experimental suite with indicated artistic preferences. For the observers, the
card indicated own preference (no strong preference) and the preferences of the three on the
opposite side of the suite (either three different artists or all the same artist). For the
observed participants, the card indicated the preferences of all six participants. The
preferences of the three on the opposite side of the observed participants were all indicated as
“no strong preference” in all conditions. In conditions of similarity, their own preferences
matched those of the other people on their side. In conditions of no similarity, the preferences
on their side were all different from one another. The participants were shown which
preference was theirs and which preferences were those of the other side. Observed
participants were shown the preferences of all three participants on the other side to prevent
questions regarding those preferences. After the distribution of the preferences, participants
were given an opportunity to practice using the PDG by filling out worksheets.
Participants were then told that there would only be one trial in which they would
decide between “X” and “Y.” They were also given a short period to compose a note to give
to the person across from them. The communications that participants on the observers’ side
received were switched with notes that expressed a desire to cooperate. The communications
received by those on the observed side were switched with three slightly different
communications that all communicated a preference for “X.” The purpose of this deception
was to ensure experimental control and to avoid participants saying anything that would
disrupt the similarity manipulation. The reason that the communications received by the
observed side were slightly different is that it may have been possible for the observed
participants to see the communications of the other participants on that side when all
observed participants were in the same room. After receiving the communications
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participants believed were from the person directly across from them, all participants made a
choice.
Participants were finally asked to fill out a packet of dependent variables, debriefed,
and dismissed. Included in the dependent variable packet were questions about perceived
entitativity. Participants were asked to rate to what degree they felt participants on the
opposite side were one group. This rating was made on a scale from one to seven with one
being “not at all” and seven being “very much.” Also, participants were asked to rate the
degree to which they felt those on the other side were individuals. Participants were also
asked to rate the degree to which they felt the participants on their own side were one group
and to the degree to which they felt the participants on their own side were individuals. The
ratings of individuality were subtracted from the ratings of the degree to which the side was a
group to get a differential entitativity rating. This was done in order to create a scale from
individuality to groupness. Participants were also asked: “To what extent did you feel the
three people on [the side of the observed participants] were similar to each other?” In
addition, we asked participants about the motives for their choices. There were 10 items
assessing five possible motives (two for each). These were combined into five individual
scales. Included among these questions were two items assessing distrust (or fear) and two
items assessing the extent to which they wanted to maximize their own outcomes. The other
motives assessed were: the desire to have outcomes better than the others (max rel), the
desire to maximize the outcomes of both sides (max joint), and the desire to minimize the
difference between the outcomes of the parties (min diff). Prior to the close-ended questions,
participants were asked open-ended questions assessing motives for decisions.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Observers’ Perceptions of Similarity of Observed Participants
Participants in the observer role were asked to what degree they thought participants
on the opposite side were similar. These results were analyzed with a 2 Common Fate X 2
Proximity X 2 Similarity univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA). In conditions of high
manipulated similarity of the observed, the participants in the observer role perceived those
on the opposite side to be more similar (M = 3.17 vs. M = 4.49), F(1, 63) = 12.35, p = .001,
partial ² = .16. No interactions affecting perceived similarity were found. No other main
effects or interactions were found.
Observed Participants’ Perceptions of Similarity among Own Side
Participants in the observed role were asked to what degree they thought those on
their own side were similar to each other and also to themselves. The results were each
analyzed with a 2 Common Fate X 2 Proximity X 2 Similarity univariate analysis of variance
(ANOVA). There was no main effect for manipulated similarity on either measure. There
were no other significant main effects or interactions. This indicates that the similarity
manipulation may have not been effective for the observed side.
Observers’ Perceptions of Entitativity of Observed Participants
Differential entitativity ratings were calculated by subtraction of ratings of
individuality from ratings of the degree to which a side was perceived as a group. The
ratings of the differential entitativity of the observed participants’ entitativity by the
16
observers were analyzed with a 2 Common Fate X 2 Proximity X 2 Similarity univariate
ANOVA. All three main effects as well as qualifying interactions were found. Common fate
level was significantly related to ratings of entitativity, F(1, 60) = 19.83, p <.001, partial ² =
.248. The presence of common fate was related to higher entitativity (M = -2.22 vs. M =
0.53). There was a significant main effect for proximity level, F(1, 60) = 5.61, p = .021,
partial ² = .085. High proximity was related to high ratings of entitativity (M = -2.44 vs. M
= 0.42). A significant main effect for similarity was also observed where in which the
presence of similarity led to higher differential entitativity ratings (M = -1.50 vs. M = -0.28),
F(1, 60) = 4.72, p = .034, partial ² = .073.
A significant interaction between proximity and similarity was found, F(1, 60) =
4.31, p = .042, partial ² = .067. Simple effects analysis of this interaction indicated that high
proximity was associated with increased differential entitativity in the absence of similarity
(F(1, 60) = 11.97, p = .001), but not in its presence (see Table 1). Similarity was associated
with increased differential entitativity in the absence of high proximity (F(1, 60) = 7.65, p =
.008), but not in its presence. The factors exerted their effects in the absence of each another.
Finally, there was a three-way interaction among common fate, proximity, and
similarity, F(1, 60) = 4.26, p = .043, partial ² = .066 (see Table 2). This three-way
interaction was probed by breaking it into component two-way interactions. The two-way
interaction of proximity and similarity was significant with common fate (F(1, 60) = 7.23, p
= .009), but not without it. Simple effects analysis of the significant component two-way
found that proximity led to higher ratings of differential entitativity in the absence of
similarity (F(1, 60) = 9.58, p = .003), but not in its presence. Likewise, similarity was
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associated with increased differential entitativity ratings in the absence of proximity (F(1, 60)
= 9.42, p = .003), but not in its presence.
The two scales making up the differential entitativity scale were also analyzed
separately. They were each analyzed using a 2 Common Fate X 2 Proximity X 2 Similarity
univariate ANOVA. The pattern of results for the group perception subscale mirrored that of
the combined measure. There were significant main effects for common fate (M = 2.97 vs.
M = 4.34), proximity (M = 2.75 vs. M = 4.39), and similarity (M = 3.31 vs. M = 3.97)
[Respectively: F(1, 60) = 23.00, p < .001, partial ² = .28; F(1, 60) = 7.54, p = .008, partial ²
= .112; and F(1, 60) = 6.11, p = .016, partial ² = .092]. The directions of these main effects
mirrored those for the differential scale exactly.
As observed for the differential scale, there was one significant two-way interaction
between proximity and similarity, F(1, 60) = 7.30, p = .009, partial ² = .109 (see Table 3).
Probing this two-way interaction with simple effects analysis reveals the same pattern of
results as obtained from the differential entitativity measure. Proximity led to increased
ratings of groupness in the absence of similarity (F(1, 60) = 18.01, p < .001), but not in its
presence. Similarity led to increased ratings of groupness when proximity was absent (F(1,
60) = 11.36, p = .001), but not in its presence. The three-way interaction was also
significant, F(1, 60) = 8.54, p = .005, partial ² = .125.
The pattern of the three-way interaction was similar, but not exactly the same, as that
of the differential scale (see Table 4). As with the differential measure, the Proximity X
Similarity interaction was significant when common fate was present (F(1, 60) = 7.23, p =
.009), but not in its absence. Simple effects analysis revealed that high proximity was
significantly related to higher ratings of groupness in the absence of similarity (F(1, 60) =
18
15.36, p < .001), and marginal in the presence of similarity (F(1, 60) = 2.91, p = .093). The
marginal effect is the only aspect of the pattern of the subscale interaction that differed from
the pattern observed for the differential scale. Similarity led to higher ratings of groupness
when proximity was absent (F(1, 60) = 14.50, p < .001), but not when it was present.
The pattern of results for the individuality subscale did not mirror the overall results
exactly. There were no significant interactions, similarity did not show a main effect, and the
main effect of proximity was marginal (F(1, 60) = 3.14, p = .082, partial ² = .050. Common
fate led to significantly lower ratings of individuality (M = 5.19 vs. M = 3.81), F(1, 60) =
13.26, p = .001, partial ² = .181.
Observed Participants’ Perceptions of Entitativity of their Own Side
Univariate ANOVA results revealed two significant main effects for differential
entitativity. Participants on the observed side reported significantly more entitativity with
common fate (M = -2.45 vs. M = -0.14), F(1, 61) = 5.98, p = .017, partial ² = .089. They
also reported more entitativity with proximity (M = -2.50 vs. M = -0.36), F(1, 61) = 7.92, p =
.007, partial ² = .115. One two-way interaction was also significant—Common Fate X
Proximity, F(1, 61) =4.77, p =.033, partial ² = .073 (see Table 5). The Common Fate X
Proximity interaction was probed with simple effects analysis. It was found that common
fate led to greater ratings of differential entitativity with high proximity (F(1, 61) = 10.74, p
= .002), but not with low proximity. Proximity led to increased ratings of differential
entitativity with common fate (F(1, 61) = 10.75, p = .002), but not without it. In this case,
the factors exerted their effects in the presence of one another. Finally, there was a marginal
interaction among all three of the independent variables, F(1, 61) = 3.68, p = .060, partial ²
= .057. Means for this marginal interaction are presented in Table 6. There was a non-
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significant tendency for the effect of common fate on differential entitativity to be the largest
in the presence of similarity and high proximity.
Results for both subscales mirrored the pattern of the overall measure’s results. For
the measure of groupness, we found a significant main effect for level of common fate (M =
2.90 vs. M = 3.93) [F(1, 61) = 4.54, p = .037, partial ² = .069], level of proximity (M = 2.81
vs. M = 3.91) [F(1, 61) = 7.89, p = .007, partial ² = .115], and a marginal three-way
interaction (F(1, 61) = 3.31, p = .074, partial ² = .051). However, the two-way interaction
between common fate and proximity was marginal, F(1, 61) = 3.15, p = .081, partial ² =
.049. For the measure of individuality, we found a significant main effect for level of
common fate (M = 5.35 vs. M = 4.07) [F(1, 61) = 6.03, p = .017, partial ² = .090], level of
proximity (M = 5.31 vs. M = 4.27) [F(1, 61) = 6.26, p = .015, partial ² = .093], a significant
two-way interaction between common fate level and proximity level (F(1, 61) = 5.34, p =
.024, partial ² = .080), and a marginal three-way interaction (F(1, 61) = 3.21, p = .078,
partial ² = .050). Examining the simple effects for the two-way interaction revealed a
similar pattern of results to the differential measure. Common fate only led to lower ratings
of individuality when proximity was high (F(1, 61) = 11.39, p = .001), and proximity only
led to lower ratings of individuality with common fate—
F(1, 61) = 9.96, p = .002 (see Table 7).
Choice Results for Observers
The data for presence or absence of competition of the observers were analyzed with
a stepwise multinomial logistic regression. First, the main effects were entered into the
model simultaneously. Examining the likelihood ratio tests for the main effects revealed a
statistically significant effect of common fate of the observed participants leading to a greater
20
proportion of competitive choices when common fate was present (0.19 vs. 0.42), ²(N=72) =
4.36, p =.037. We did not find any two-way interactions to be significant after entering them
into the model. The three-way interaction was unable to be tested due to a quasi-complete
separation in the data leading to a situation where the model could not converge and model
fit was uncertain. Though far from ideal, it is possible to test a dichotomous response
variable in the general linear model (GLM). For purposes of exploration, we examined the
results of a factorial combination of our independent variables with choice as a dependent
variable in a GLM analysis. The three-way interaction was not significant1.
Choice Results for Observed Participants
The data for competition of the observed participants were also analyzed with a
stepwise multinomial logistic regression. When the main effects were entered into the model
simultaneously, we uncovered one significant main effect. The likelihood ratio tests for the
main effects revealed a statistically significant effect of common fate of the observed
participants leading to a greater proportion of competitive choices (0.10 vs. 0.28), ²(N=72) =
4.09, p =.043. Next, the two-way interactions were entered into the regression. The two-way
interaction between common fate level and proximity was significant, ²(N=72) = 5.80, p
=.016 (see Table 8). However, the validity of the model fit was uncertain due to several cells
containing only cooperative responses. Analyzing the results with GLM revealed a marginal
interaction between the two variables, F(1, 64) = 3.58, p = .063, partial ² = .053. Examining
1 The effect of common fate in the GLM was marginal, F(1, 64) = 3.85, p = .054.
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the cell means reveals that common fate had a larger effect in the presence of high proximity
than in the presence of low proximity2. The three-way interaction did not reach significance.
Reasons for Choices of Observers
The ten items assessing the five different reasons for PDG choice were combined into
five variables. Split-half reliabilities were calculated for these variables. The Spearman-
Brown reliability coefficient of the items making up the distrust variable was .84. The items
making up the max own variable had a Spearman-Brown reliability of .84. Reliabilities for
the max rel, max joint, and min diff variables were .89, .90, and .60 respectively. The open-
ended assessments were scored for the presence or absence of the five reasons by two
observers. The Spearman-Brown reliability coefficient for these open-ended assessments was
.97 for the distrust motive. It was .95 for max own. Max rel’s coefficient was .76. Max joint
and Min diff had coefficients of .75 and .91, respectively. These ratings were averaged
across the two observers. The open-ended and close-ended reason assessments were
converted to standard scores and averaged. The reliability coefficients were calculated
according to Nunnally and Bernstein’s (1994) method for computing reliabilities of summed
standard scores. The coefficients obtained were: .63 for distrust, .64 for max own, .50 for
max rel, .61 for max joint, and .57 for min diff. Reasons for choices were analyzed with a
series of 2 Common fate X 2 Proximity X 2 Similarity univariate ANOVAs.
No significant effects for any reason other that distrust were found. A significant
main effect of common fate was found in which the presence of common fate led to higher
reported distrust (M = -.31 vs. M = .32), F(1, 63) = 8.58, p = .005, partial ² = .123.
2 Simple effects analysis of the marginal interaction shows that in the presence of high proximity, common fate
led to greater competition (F(1, 64) = 7.175, p = .009), but it did not when proximity was low.
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Reasons for Choices of Observed Participants
The ten items assessing the five different reasons for PDG choices of observed
participants were also combined into five variables. The Spearman-Brown split-half
reliability coefficient of the items making up the distrust variable was .64. The items making
up the max own, max rel, max joint, and min diff variables had reliabilities of .84, .82, .75,
and .58 respectively. The open-ended items for assessing reasons were treated the same as
they were for observers. The inter-rater reliability was calculated using the Spearman-Brown
corrected correlation. The coefficient for distrust was .41. Max own had a coefficient of .86.
Max rel had a coefficient of .45. The coefficient of max joint was .69. Min diff had a
coefficient of .71. The open-ended and close-ended reason assessments were converted to
standard scores and averaged as they were for the observers. The reliability coefficients for
the observed participants’ open and close-ended responses were: .65 for distrust, .89 for max
own, .64 for max rel, .76 for max joint, and .76 for min diff (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
These reasons were analyzed with a series of 2 Common fate X 2 Proximity X 2 Similarity
univariate ANOVAs.
There were no significant effects on distrust. There were several notable results for
max own. Similarity led to a significant main effect where participants reported higher max
own (M = -.18 vs. M = .16), F(1,64) = 4.67, p = .035, partial ² = .068. We found a
3 One marginal interaction was found for distrust. The three-way interaction of common fate, proximity, and
similarity affecting distrust was marginal (F(1,63) = 3.02, p = .087, partial ² = .046). Means for this marginal
interaction are displayed in Table 9. There was a non-significant tendency for the effect of common fate on
distrust to be smallest when proximity was high and similarity was low. For the variable of max own, common
fate showed a marginal main effect in which common fate lead to increased reporting of max own motivations
(M = -.17 vs. M = .17), F(1,63) = 2.93, p = .092, partial ² = .044. There were no significant or marginal main
effects or interactions for any of the independent variables on the response variables of max rel and min diff.
There was one marginal interaction involving the max joint variable. The three-way interaction of common
fate, proximity, and similarity affecting max joint was marginal (F(1,63) = 3.06, p = .085, partial ² = .046).
Means for this marginal interaction are displayed in Table 10. There was a non-significant tendency for
common fate to reduce max joint reporting in the presence of similarity and high proximity, but for this effect
was descriptively reversed when similarity was absent and proximity was low.
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significant two-way interaction between common fate and proximity level for max own
F(1,64) = 5.56, p = .021, partial ² = .080 (see Table 11). Simple effects analysis revealed a
significant increase in max own for common fate in the presence of high proximity (F(1, 64)
= 6.05, p = .017), but not in its absence. Proximity was associated with marginally higher
reported max own with common fate (F(1, 64) = 3.70, p = .059), but not without common
fate. We also found a significant two-way interaction between common fate and similarity
for max own, F(1,64) = 5.06, p = .028, partial ² = .073 (see Table 12). Simple effects
analysis revealed a significant increase in max own for common fate in the presence of
similarity (F(1, 64) = 6.62, p = .012), but not in its absence. Similarity was associated with
significantly higher max own with common fate (F(1, 64) = 8.89, p = .004), but not without
it. One significant effect for max rel was found. Max rel was greater in the presence of
similarity (M = -.20 vs. M = .18), F(1,64) = 5.93, p = .018, partial ² = .0854.
There was a significant two-way interaction between common fate and proximity for
max joint, F(1,64) = 10.97, p = .002, partial ² = .146 (see Table 13). Simple effects analysis
revealed a significant decrease in max joint for common fate with high proximity (F(1, 64) =
9.06, p = .004), but not with low proximity. High proximity led to a significant decrease in
max joint with common fate (F(1, 64) = 7.69, p = .007), but this effect was marginally
reversed without common fate, F(1, 64) = 3.51, p = .0615.
4 There was a marginal effect for common fate to be associated with higher max rel (M = -.13 vs. M = .16),
F(1,64) = 2.85, p = .097, partial ² = .043.
5 There was also a marginal effect of similarity on max joint such that the presence of similarity led to lower
max joint, (M = .19 vs. M = -.17), F(1,64) = 3.64, p = .061, partial ² = .054. Finally, there was a marginal
effect of similarity on min diff such that the presence of similarity led to less min diff (M = .17 vs. M = -.16),
F(1,64) = 3.05, p = .086, partial ² = .045.
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Mediational Analyses of Entitativity and Choice
We were interested in several possible mediators of choice in the data. The first of
these was the possibility that entitativity might mediate choice. We first analyzed the
observers’ data for the possibility of mediation first. Specifically, we were interested on
testing whether common fate exerts its effects on choice through entitativity. We tested the
differential entitativity measure and both subscales for heterogeneity of regression by
entering the interactions of common fate and those variables sequentially in a logistic
regression. No significant heterogeneity of regression was found for any measure of
entitativity. We then entered the entitativity variables as covariates in a series of logistic
regressions. No significant effects on choice were found for the differential entitativity
measure (²(N=72) = .181, p =.67), the groupness subscale, (²(N=72) = 0.053, p =.82), or
the individuality subscale (²(N=72) = 0.294, p =.596.
Our next step was to analyze the data of the observed participants for the possibility
of mediation by entitativity. No heterogeneity of regression was found for the differential
entitativity measure or either subscale. When entered as a covariate in a logistic regression
with the main effects of our three predictors, differential entitativity was not significantly
related to choice, ²(N=72) = 0.711, p =.407. This was also true of the groupness (²(N=72) =
0.93, p =.34) and individuality (²(N=72) = 0.44, p =.50) subscales.
Mediational Analyses of Reasons and Choice
We wished to test for the possibility of mediation of common fate level’s effects on
choice by any of the reasons. We started with the data for observers. As previously stated,
distrust was significantly related to common fate level and common fate level was
6 The correlation between choice and differential entitativity for observers was r(68) = .102, p = .41.
7 The correlation between choice and differential entitativity for observed participants was r(69) = .17, p = .15.
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significantly related to choice. No significant heterogeneity of regression was found for
distrust with common fate level. Entering distrust as a covariate in a multinomial logistic
regression with the main effects of common fate, similarity, and proximity revealed that
distrust was significantly related to choice, ²(N=72) = 27.40, p <.001. Additionally, the
effect of common fate was no longer significant, ²(N=72) = .002, p =.96. The indirect effect
of common fate on choice through distrust was significant, z´ = 2.18, p < .018 (MacKinnon,
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). Our results are consistent with the possibility
of mediation of common fate’s effects on choice by distrust. Next, we examined the data for
observed participants. No reasons were significantly associated with common fate level.
Therefore, we did not further test for mediation.
8 The z’ statistic was calculated using values from ANOVA-type regression consistent with Wildschut, Insko,
and Gaertner (2002). As this is not ideal for dichotomous variables, results must be interpreted with caution.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Perceptions of Similarity of Observed Participants
The similarity ratings showed that in the conditions where similarity was supposed to
be high, observers did indeed perceive those on the opposite side as similar to each other.
The manipulation seemed to have been effective. Unexpectedly, the participants on the
observed side did not perceive more similarity among themselves when they had the same as
opposed to different artistic preferences. The manipulation of similarity failed for the
observed participants. It is interesting that the similarity manipulation had no significant
effect on the observed participants view of themselves even though the manipulation did
affect the observers’ view of the observed participants. Perhaps this difference is an
indication that our views of ourselves are more resistant to change than are our views of
others.
Observers’ Perceptions of Entitativity of Observed and Observers’ Choices
The results revealed that common fate, proximity, and similarity had significant main
effects on ratings of perceived entitativity in addition there being several qualifying
interactions. If the pattern of results had been mirrored in the choice results it would be
simple to conclude that both were strong indicators of entitativity. However, the choice
results did not mirror the results for perceived entitativity (See Table 14 for a summary of
significant choice and differential entitativity effects for both observers and observed
participants). In fact, common fate was the only significant predictor of choice. Why is it
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that the supposed “behavioral confirmation” of the effect of entitativity showed a different
pattern of results than a direct measure of perceived entitativity?
One possible explanation may be that participants have several conceptions of the
word “group.” We did not supply a definition for the word group, but simply asked
participants to what degree the participants on one side were seen as more of a group and less
as individuals. In common parlance the word group can mean many things. Several
individuals standing on a street corner can be seen as a group even though they might not
know each other or talk to one another. In social psychology, a “real” group is often thought
of as two or more people who may interact with one another and possess a degree of
interdependence (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Lewin, 1948). In this sense, the groups in this
experiment were only real groups when there was common fate. This is because the majority
decision rule created a situation in which participants’ outcomes were partially determined by
the decisions of the two others on their side. This finding for common fate supports prior
research (Insko et al., 1988) which found that a consensus rule was necessary for increased
competition. However, the study in which this finding was reported involved groups
interacting with groups. Our findings extend this result to individuals observing groups and
groups observing just themselves.
Observed Participants’ Perceptions of Entitativity of Own side and Choices
The observed participants followed a slightly different pattern. Common fate
increased competition. This tracks the results of Insko et al. (1988). The two-way
interaction between proximity and common fate in this study further indicated that proximity
boosted the effect of common fate. Proximity by itself was not effective in creating
competition in either this study or the study of Insko et al. (1988).
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Observed participants perceived greater entitativity with common fate. Proximity
also increased entitativity. The interaction of proximity and common fate revealed that
common fate exerted its effects most strongly when proximity was high. Taken together, the
results for entitativity and choice reveal that proximity moderates the effects of common fate
across different response variables. The discontinuity results for observed participants
provide partial support for our hypothesis that proximity and similarity would enhance the
effect of common fate.
It was expected that the entitativity results would mirror the discontinuity results for
all participants. This was clearly not the case for observers. The results for observed
participants were similar, though not exactly the same. Past research by Insko and colleagues
(1988) studied proximity and common fate jointly, but not in a factorial design and thus
could not differentiate the independent and interactive effects on entitativity and choice.
Also, older research did not test for mediation, but the parallel effects of groups versus
individuals on both entitativity and choice suggested that entitativity might mediate the
discontinuity effect. Despite some similarity in the pattern of results (Table 14), the present
results do no significantly indicate that entitativity was a mediator of choice.
Distrust
Mirroring previous discontinuity research, this study finds that distrust (or fear)
functions as a mediator for the discontinuity effects shown for observers. The results did not
hold for the observed side. These results are partially at odds with Winquist and Larson’s
(2004) findings. Winquist and Larson found that distrust mediated effects for both
individuals interacting with groups and groups interacting with individuals. We found
mediation by distrust for individuals interacting with groups (consistent with the concept of
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outgroup schema-based distrust), but not groups interacting with individuals. However,
Winquist and Larson used a different procedure in their study. It is not precisely clear, but it
can be inferred that participants in groups came to a consensus through discussion. The
observed participants, even those in the same room, did not talk to one another during our
study.
It seems that discussion and consensus make for a very powerful manipulation.
However, they are not necessary to produce discontinuity effects. What then could explain
the enhanced competition/reduced cooperation observed for those participants in a group
who did not experience distrust? One possibility is max rel, but we were unable to test it due
to the marginality of the finding. We can only speculate as to possible mediators of the
relationship between common fate and competition. It is possible that there may be a variable
that mediates this relationship in addition to being a more complete mediator of the
discontinuity results for the observers. So, we are looking for a variable that would be
associated with the indices of entitativity and that could lead to competition. Entitativity
itself has been revealed as a poor candidate, but it may be productive to approach the
problem from a different angle than is standard in discontinuity research. Perhaps we should
be looking for a variable that mediates cooperation in individual conditions rather than a
variable that mediates competition in group conditions. Campbell’s indices of entitativity
may create competition through disrupting or circumventing a normal process that leads to
cooperation. The tendency to cooperate, whether learned or innate, may not generalize to
group situations. Cooperation may be mediated by some sort of personal connection or
presence felt by one person for another. When one realizes that one is interacting with a
person, the primary objective may be to treat that person in a humane fashion. Otherwise,
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one might treat a PDG situation as if it were a game to be won (i.e. a max rel intent).
Whether it is referred to as chemistry, bonding, humanization, personal connection, or any of
a host of other names, it may be that this elusive variable is the mediator that we seek. It may
be that discontinuity effects arise not from a perception of others as a group, but a lack of
some humanizing quality that is reduced by the variables that increase entitativity.
Future research will investigate other possible mediators of the discontinuity effect.
Also, we wish to investigate the factorial combination of entitativity indicators in a group-on-
group interaction. Wildschut, Insko, and Pinter (2007) find the discontinuity effect to be a
joint function of interacting with a group and interacting as a group.
Considerations
Though our similarity manipulation led to perceived similarity among
observers, the lack of perceived similarity main effects among observed participants indicates
that our manipulation may not be as strong as we would like. It appears to be difficult to
manipulate peoples’ perceptions of their own similarity to others when they can see those
others. However, it is possible that an alternative manipulation might do so. Another
concern is the strength of the common fate manipulation. Majority vote is quite different
from consensus reached through discussion.
Conclusions
Increased competition was found for both individuals interacting with groups and
groups interacting with individuals in the presence of common fate consistent with the body
of literature. A two-way interaction for groups interacting with individuals was found in
which proximity accentuated the effect of common fate. Perceived entitativity was not found
to significantly mediate any of these effects.
31
Table 1
Mean observer ratings of the differential entitativity of observed participants as a function of
similarity and proximity
Similarity High Proximity Low Proximity
High 0.45 -1.50
Low 0.38 -3.00
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Table 2
Mean observer ratings of the differential entitativity of observed participants as a function of
similarity, proximity, and common fate
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Common Fate
Similarity
High 1.50 3.67
Low 2.00 -2.27
No Common Fate
Similarity
High -0.60 -3.22
Low -1.25 -3.89
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Table 3
Mean observer ratings of the groupness of observed participants as a function of similarity
and proximity
Similarity High Proximity Low Proximity
High 4.35 3.33
Low 4.44 2.40
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Table 4
Mean observer ratings of the groupness of observed participants as a function of similarity,
proximity, and common fate
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Common Fate
Similarity
High 4.70 6.33
Low 5.38 2.73
No Common Fate
Similarity
High 4.00 2.33
Low 3.50 2.00
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Table 5
Mean ratings of observed participants of the differential entitativity of own side as a function
of proximity and common fate
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Common Fate 1.56 -2.23
No Common Fate -2.18 -2.65
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Table 6
Mean ratings of observed participants of the differential entitativity of own side as a function
of similarity, proximity, and common fate
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Common Fate
Similarity
High 2.44 -3.20
Low 0.43 -1.63 
 
No Common Fate
Similarity
High -2.40 -1.73 
 
Low -1.86 -3.50
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Table 7
Mean ratings of observed participants of the individuality of own side as a function of
proximity and common fate
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Common Fate 3.19 5.29
No Common Fate 5.15 5.39
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Table 8
Proportion of non-cooperative choices of observed participants as a function of proximity
and common fate
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Ensured Common .38 .19
Self-Determined .00 .17
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Table 9
Mean distrust z scores as a function of similarity, proximity, and common fate for observers
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Common Fate
Similarity
High .48 .024
Low .024 .54
No Common Fate
Similarity
High -.36 -.30
Low -.12 -.43
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Table 10
Mean max joint z scores as a function of similarity, proximity, and common fate for
observers
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Common Fate
Similarity
High -.12 .029
Low -.026 .091
No Common Fate
Similarity
High .63 -.59
Low -.13 .027
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Table 11
Mean max own z scores as a function of proximity and common fate for observed
participants
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Common Fate .44 -.17
No Common Fate -.31   .039
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Table 12
Mean max own z scores as a function of similarity and common fate for observed
participants
Fate High Similarity Low Similarity
Common Fate .53 -.31
No Common Fate -.14 -.078
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Table 13
Mean max joint z scores as a function of proximity and common fate for observed
participants
Fate High Proximity Low Proximity
Common Fate -.49 .28
No Common Fate .34 -.10
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Table 14
A summary table giving significant effects for differential entitativity and competition
Observers Observed
Entitativity Choice Entitativity Choice
Common Fate* Common Fate* Common Fate* Common Fate*
Proximity* Proximity*
Similarity*
Proximity X Common Fate X Common Fate X
Similarity Proximityab Proximitya
Common Fate X
Proximity X
Similarity
Note. * indicates positive association between factor and response variable of interest.
Superscript a indicates common fate led to significant effect in presence of high proximity.
Superscript b indicates proximity led to significant effect in presence of ensured common
fate.
45
Figure 1. An example of a matrix used in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
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